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Central Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
in a Monetary Union
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Abstract
The income velocity of circulation has been subject to a trend decline in all the
member states of the European Monetary Union since its inception. In this
paper, we propose an explanation for this in terms of a measure of the ECB’s
inflation fighting credibility. This credibility gain variable, which is derived in this
paper, is based on the ECB’s performance in maintaining price stability relative
to the respective member states’ inflation experiences from the legacy monetary-
inflation regimes of the past. Our empirical analysis reveals that this credibility
gain variable has a highly significant and sizeable impact on income velocity in
member states. On average across member states, a one per cent increase in
credibility gain, according to our measure, leads to a decreace in income
velocity of half a per cent. The model and results presented suggest that the
ECB should, in formulating the second pillar of its monetary policy strategy,
factor in its own price stability credibility. Our results also imply that, if inflation
fighting credibility is lost temporarily, it is hugely important to re-establish it as
soon as possible.
* The authors are Senior Advisor to the Governor and Economist in the Financial Stability Department, respectively. The views expressed in this
article are those of the authors and are not necessarily those held by the Central Bank of Ireland or ESCB. Corresponding author:
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1. Introduction
Money demand is probably one of the most
actively researched areas of economics. The
special role for money in the ECB’s monetary
policy strategy has prompted a flurry of papers
in this area especially from the ECB itself.
Although there is a good deal of differentiation
among these papers, this is mostly in relation
to econometric technique rather than novel
theoretical approaches
1.
The objective of this article is to look at one
aspect of money demand in a currency union
with a central bank having, as in the case of
the ECB, price stability as its primary statutory
responsibility. Our examination starts from an
observation of a salient fact of money
behaviour in the euro area: since the start of
EMU the income velocity of money has been
trended downwards throughout almost the full
time period of EMU in all of the founding eleven
member states of the monetary union
2.N o
generally accepted and plausible rationale
seems to have been offered for this
phenomenon. Some major countries outside of
the euro area, for example, the US, do not
exhibit the same systematic pattern, with US
income velocity of money not subject to a trend
1 For example, Coenen & Vega (2001), Gerlach & Svensson (2003),
Greiber & Lemke (2005), Carstensen (2006), Greiber & Setzer
(2007), Boone & Van Den Noord (2008) and Bjornland & Leitemo
(2008).
2 We do not consider Luxembourg given its exceptional role in
international financial markets.
Chart 1:  Scatter Plot of Cumulative Changes in Monetary Credibility and

































































and apparently evolving with the business
cycle.
There is also a systematic difference in the
behaviour of the income velocity of money
across member states of the monetary union
since the start of 1999. Member countries with
consistently poor records on inflation before the
start of monetary union have experienced a
substantially larger reduction in income velocity
since the start of monetary union. This has
persisted up until recently. It is truly an
extraordinary pattern and so salient that it is
somewhat surprising that it does not appear to
have been noticed before now.
We argue that this cross-country pattern of
income velocity is systematically related,
indeed driven by, the respective price
level/inflation experiences of those member
states before monetary union commenced
relative to their respective expectations of price
level evolution after the start of monetary union.
This, in turn, depends on money holders’
expectations of the ECB’s performance in
maintaining price stability. These expectations
are assumed to evolve in real time as money
holders learn from experience how credible the
ECB is in delivering on its statutory objective of
price stability. We propose a measure of
central bank credibility gain with respect to
price stability which we then relate to the
evolution of income velocity.Central Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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The systematic pattern between these two
variables across the member states of the
monetary union is displayed in the scatter plot
in Chart 1. The horizontal axis in the chart
shows our measure of the cumulative
percentage change in price stability credibility.
The precise formula used to derive this variable
is postponed until Section 2 of the paper where
it is explained in detail. Briefly, it compares the
legacy inflation regimes of member states with
their inflation experiences in monetary union.
This legacy inflation regime is taken to be best
represented by the ten-year period from 1984
to 1994. We set the end-point of this regime at
1994, and not at the start of monetary union
itself (1999), since some of the benign inflation
experience in this five-year ‘‘interim period’’
(1994-1999) may be due to the efforts countries
were making to qualify for monetary union (as
documented in the various Convergence
Reports prepared for application countries)
and, therefore, in a sense, due to monetary
union itself. Indeed, the inflation performance of
member states during this interim period was
remarkably good with both a lower level and
lower volatility of inflation than even in monetary
union itself (see Chart 2). The vertical axis (in
Chart 1) shows the cumulative fall in the
income velocity of circulation since the start of
monetary union for all ten countries in our
sample.
For those core countries that belonged to the
narrow ERM bands and that were subject to
Bundesbank monetary policy before the start of
monetary union and, on foot of this, enjoyed
price stability (i.e., Germany itself, France,
Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium) there
has been either no fall in velocity or at best
only a very moderate downward trend since the
start of monetary union. In the scatter plot, four
of these five countries are located in the upper
left hand corner of Chart 1. The countries
towards the bottom right hand corner (i.e.,
Finland and Portugal) were the ones that
experienced the steepest cumulative
reductions in income velocity in monetary union
and suffered the sharpest cumulative increase
in inflation in the decade and a half before the
commencement of the ‘‘interim period’’ leading
up to the start of monetary union. Countries
with intermediate experiences (i.e., Italy and
Spain) lie in the middle as our theory suggests.
To further illustrate this point, Chart 4 presents
non-parametric distributions fitted to core
(German) and periphery (Italian) inflation rates
over two sample periods: (i) a pre-EMU regime
from 1980-1990 and (ii) a post EMU-regime
1999-2010. There are only modest gains to
German inflation rates after EMU, with small
reductions in mean and variance. Italian
inflation underwent a much greater
transformation, with the mean decreasing by
over 4 percentage points and considerably
smaller variance. In fact, in the post-EMU era,
Italian inflation rates are a tighter fit around
their mean than German rates.Central Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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Chart 4:  Fitted Distributions to German and
  Italian Inflation Pre and Post EMU

















































Notes (Chart 4): A Karnel smoothing technique is used to estimate nonparametric density functions of inflation rates over two sample
periods; (i) Pre EMU (1980-1990) and (ii) Post EMU (1999-2010)
For most countries adopting the euro, monetary
union constituted a double regime shift. The
first was the adoption of the single currency,
albeit only as a scriptural currency between
January 1999 and January 2001 when the new
euro notes and coin were introduced. The
second was coming under a new monetary
regime governed by a central bank (the ECB)
which was statutorily committed to price
stability. For the first group of countries noted
above, this latter was not such a major regime
shift since this was more or less exactly the
kind of regime they had already enjoyed. But
for the latter group it did, indeed, amount to a
major regime shift given their higher inflation
records before the start of our ‘‘interim period’’
leading up to monetary union. From the point of
view of the argument here, it is the monetary
policy regime shift that is relevant.
The paper is essentially about past price level
movements, taken from high inflation regimes,
relative to the experience of price level
movements in EMU under the new statutory
framework directed at price stability governing
the ECB’s monetary policy. Money holders see
the tax on money as being much lower than in
the past under pre-EMU monetary policy
regimes. With the fall in the inflation tax, people
are willing to hold more money balances. It is
therefore about comparing the actual
experience of inflation in the past with the
unfolding inflation experience in EMU and the
effect of this on money velocity; it is mostly a
backward-looking variable. It is not therefore
about inflation expectations, a forward-looking
variable. That is why an inflation expectations
variable has been included as a separate
argument in the demand for money (velocity
specification) used below which yields sensible
theoretical results.
The approach is new in that it is something that
money demand functions have not looked at in
the past. In a sense, EMU provides the ideal
context within which to look at this issue since
a clear break in the monetary regime can be
identified for a group of countries that came
into EMU from endemically high inflation
regimes. There is also a control group of
countries which came from price stability
regimes and for whom there was little or no
change in monetary regime on entering
monetary union. The increase in the demand
for money (fall in velocity) was much greater for
the former than the latter as shown in our
scatter plot above.
This article proceeds as follows: Section 3
proposes an explanation for the systematic
country-specific trend behaviour of income
velocity since the start of monetary union and
the role of price stability credibility in this (our
theory); Section 4 documents informal
graphical evidence in support of the theory.
Section 5 reports on the supportingCentral Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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econometric results of the relationship between
central bank credibility and income velocity
using a co-integration framework; Section 6
discusses the one exception to the pattern
uncovered, Ireland (see Chart 1), and tries to
explain what might account for this. There are
no references in the economic literature which
deal with the type of issue being discussed
here. There is only one of which the authors are
aware and even this is only tangentially
relevant. The next section of the paper
discusses it briefly. Section 7 looks at some
potential policy issues in a preliminary way.
2. Money Demand (Velocity) and
Monetary Union
Honohan (1984) has argued that the break-up
of a monetary union increases the demand for
money. The logic behind this argument
suggests that the corollary should also hold:
the creation of a monetary union should lead to
a fall in the aggregate demand for money.
In March 1979, the long-standing currency
union between the Irish pound and sterling was
discontinued. Transactions between the two
currencies became costly. Over the following
several quarters there was a substantial
increase in non-bank holdings of Irish currency,
which could not be explained by statistical
models which had worked well up to then. In
this context, it seems worthwhile to note that a
standard model of money demand predicts a
discrete jump in equilibrium money demand as
a result of such a regime shift.
Honohan’s rationale for why an increase (and
decrease, presumably, although he does not
deal with this case) would result from a break-
up (creation) of a monetary union arises
exclusively from transactions cost
considerations in the foreign-exchange market.
For some combination of endowments of
domestic and foreign goods, the absence of
foreign-exchange transactions costs under a
monetary union would lead to the transfer of
funds back and forth across international
frontiers in successive periods. With the
introduction of foreign-exchange transactions
costs, there is an incentive to hold balances in
both currencies to economise on these
transactions costs. The economies in money
holdings coming from the single currency
would mostly affect the corporate sector rather
than the household sector. In the lead up to
monetary union proper (i.e., so-called Stage
Three of EMU), they are likely to have held
transactions balances in many, if not all, of the
member countries even if they had a presence
in only one or at best a few member countries.
They would be even more likely to have held
transactions balances in the denominations of
all the member countries if they had a
presence in these same countries. Therefore,
the sums involved are potentially quite
substantial and, accordingly, the savings in
transactions balances to be made all the more
substantial.
Yet another factor that would serve to reduce
the demand for money is not only the
improvement in both retail and wholesale
payments systems but the introduction of new
payments systems. It has been mentioned as
far back as July 1998 in the ECB’s ‘‘TARGET
brochure’’ that: ‘‘With TARGET, international
corporate cash management will be able to
make substantial efficiency gains. The real-time
execution of TARGET payments will reduce the
float and make it possible to optimise cash
management in euro. Participants’ corporate
customers might therefore be particularly
interested in having their financial payments
executed via TARGET’’. In other words, by
using one currency instead of several, the
corporate sector in particular should have
enjoyed considerable economies in the
holdings of transactions’ balances related to
cross-border trade. In addition, it also says
that: ‘‘The high speed with which payments in
TARGET will be processed will facilitate and
improve cash management. Moreover, this will
enable participants to increase their turnover of
funds’’. The speed with which payments are
processed with the increasingly available
electronic payments systems at the retail level
(e.g., prepaid and debit cards) may also have
encouraged considerable economies in the
holdings of not only bank deposits but also
notes and coin.
All of these effects stem from monetary union
and payment innovation both at the wholesale
and retail levels, rather than from a newCentral Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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monetary regime devoted to price stability
which coincided with the start of monetary
union. Since our focus is on the latter rather
than the former we do not explore these
interesting theories further here. They do,
however, all point to further economies in the
holding of money balances. If the effect of
these economies in money holdings were
present in the data they would have placed
upward pressure on income velocity. This
implies that the actual observed reduction in
velocity might even understate the downward
effect on income velocity coming from the
growing price stability credibility of the ECB —
the phenomenon to which we are bringing
attention in this paper.
3. Price Stability and Income
Velocity — the Mechanism
Chart 1 shows the effect of price stability
credibility on money velocity across the
member states of the Eurosystem. Credibility is
taken as an average of the respective
countries’ experiences of price stability after
the start of monetary union and cumulative
price level increases for fifteen years before the
start of what we are calling the ‘‘interim period’’
Price level
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Figure 1: Price Level before and after the Start of Monetary Union:
 A  Stylised  Representation
leading up to the commencement of monetary
union in January 1999. This average cross-
section evidence supports our proposition that
credibility for price stability increases the
demand for money relative to the demand that
would have been justified by purely
transactions needs, as proxied by nominal
income, especially in cases where this
credibility was previously lacking.
So much for the cross-country evidence! But
how does this effect manifest itself in an
individual-country time-series context? We
attempt to address this using Figure 1. This
displays a highly stylised version of the
mechanism which we think is behind the
systematic behaviour of income velocity since
the start of monetary union for a representative
individual member state.
Inflation is a tax on money holdings; therefore
lower inflation increases holdings of money. A
sustained reduction in inflation that is credible
should have the effect of reducing the income
velocity of circulation, i.e., the ratio of nominal
income to the money stock. A measure of that
credibility should therefore be correlated with
income velocity.Central Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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To examine this, we develop a variable to
capture price stability credibility. It is measured
by comparing the inflation experience in EMU
with the legacy inflation regimes of the
respective member countries. The appropriate
time span needed to reflect the pre-EMU
legacy monetary and inflation regime has to be
selected first. This is chosen as starting ten
years prior to the start of the ‘‘interim period’’.
What is relevant here is not individual episodes
of short-lived inflation but rather what we are
calling inflation regimes. These are monetary
regimes or arrangements that generate
persistent patterns of inflation over lengthy
periods of time, such as the ten year period
(1984–1994) on which we have chosen to
focus. For the ten member states these
regimes vary from price stability to high,
variable and persistent inflation.
Although the ECB was, and of course still is,
statutorily committed to price stability, there
was no guarantee at the start of monetary
union that it would always succeed in achieving
it successfully in an entirely new and
unprecedented setting for monetary policy.
Starting from the inception of monetary union,
the legacy inflation experience from the old
regime is summarised by the ratio of the price
level at the start of monetary union relative to
what it was in the past. We choose to go back
15 years, or 60 quarters, or ten years before
the start of the ‘‘interim period’’, to fully capture
this past experience. This means starting in
1984.
The variable used to capture credibility is the
ratio of the price level at any point in time in
monetary union relative to what it was 60
quarters previously, i.e., the cumulative
percentage increase in the price level.
Therefore, the monetary credibility variable,
CRED, is given as,
This assumes that money holders have fixed
memories of 15 years (60 quarters) and, as
they live through monetary union, this memory
horizon remains fixed. For a central bank that is
perceived as credible in its declared objective
of price stability, this variable would fall
systematically since the start of the new
monetary regime which was also the start of
monetary union (this is clear from Figure 1).
However, it would only decline for those
countries which previously suffered high
inflation regimes. This decline would be
accompanied by a similar decline in income
velocity arising from the belief that the inflation
tax on money holdings had been finally
eliminated. And, the bigger the credible and
sustainable fall in inflation the greater the
increase in the demand for money and the
bigger the knock-on fall in income velocity. As
we have seen, this pattern is reflected in
Chart 1.
CRED is therefore the price stability credibility
gain in moving between two different monetary
regimes. So, the credibility gain for Italy is
much greater than the credibility gain for
Germany. We take the realised inflation rate as
the indicator of whether the ECB is delivering
on its price stability objective. This, relative to
the inflation in the old pre-EMU (indeed, pre-
‘‘interim period’’) regime, is an indicator of the
gain in price stability credibility.
In Figure 2, A represents the level of credibility
at the start of monetary union. Just one period
into monetary union, the level of credibility is B,
a gain relative to A
(i.e., Pt+1/Pt–59*100 falls relative to Pt/Pt–60*100).




1 is the price level increase in
the old regime and Y
1 the price level increase
in monetary union, where the difference in time
interval is the constant memory horizon of
money holders. So the gain in credibility is the
difference in the inflation performance in the
two monetary regimes. Progressing through
monetary union from A to B to C to D indicates
a growing level of ECB inflation fighting
credibility. As depicted in Figure 2, the
increase in the price level (Y
1, Y
2) gets smaller
and smaller relative to the increase in the price
level in the old inflation regime (i.e., X
1, X
2). It is
therefore clear from Figure 2 that what we are
comparing, in effect, is the slope of the path of
the price level in monetary union with the slope
of the path of the price level before the ‘‘interim
period’’ before monetary union at a 15-year
(60-quarter) memory horizon displacement. If
the ratio of these two slopes falls throughout
the period of monetary union then the ECB will
have gained credibility consistently.Central Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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The expectation on adopting the euro was that
the inflation regime for the countries coming
from high inflation regimes was about to
change radically. However, money holders in
these countries would only find out if this was
so with the passage of time. They would only
find out, in effect, from the performance of the
ECB in delivering on its price stability pledge.
They were therefore subject to a learning
process. Our theory suggests that, as
credibility was strengthened over time, it would
be mirrored in the gradual but systematic fall in
the variable Pt+i/Pt–i–60. And, accordingly, a
belief that tax without representation would
finally have come to an end, led to a gradual
and equally systematic fall in income velocity.
This stems from an increased money demand
relative to the need for money for transactions
purposes as proxied by nominal income, in
other words, a fall in the income velocity of
money.
If both monetary union and the ECB’s price
stability objective had been fully and
unequivocally credible at the start of monetary
union then there would have been a sharp
steep reduction in income velocity at that time.
However, it would not be reasonable to expect
this to have happened. The ECB was operating
monetary policy in an unprecedented pan-
European federal institutional arrangement, in a
new financial setting and for a group of
countries for which the one cap was unlikely to
fit all. Gaining, and maintaining, a reputation for
price stability would not have been inevitable.
Money holders would only learn about ECB
credibility by way of its performance in hitting
its declared price stability target. We would
therefore expect our credibility variable and
income velocity to both move in tandem as the
ECB’s reputation as an inflation fighter was
confirmed over time.
For those countries adopting the euro in
January 1999 but coming from a monetary
regime which was already one of price stability,
or close to it, our theory would point to two
patterns of behaviour. First, the Pt+i/Pt–i–60 would
be close to a straight line both before the start
of monetary union and following the start of
monetary union, and secondly, income velocity
would similarly follow the pattern of a straight
line but not necessarily the same straight line
as that for the credibility variable.
4. Informal Graphical Evidence
The national charts all (see Appendix) display
the downward trend in the price stabilityCentral Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
in a Monetary Union
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credibility measure (i.e., representing gains in
ECB credibility). In virtually all cases this is
accompanied by a trend reduction in the
income velocity of circulation. In most cases
the two cumulative changes from the start of
monetary union up to, and including 2010Q2,
are not dissimilar. The cumulative percentage
fall in income velocity and credibility variable
(i.e., improvement in credibility) between the
start of monetary union and 2009Q4 were
27 and 32 per cent, respectively.
As expected, the smallest reductions are for
the four core countries in the sample. The
biggest reductions in both the credibility
variable and the velocity variable have been for
the countries with the worst inflation records
before the start of the ‘‘interim period’’ leading
up to the start of monetary union.
This is quite an extraordinary result since one
variable that is taken predominantly from a data
sample up to fifteen years before the
commencement of monetary union is highly
correlated with another variable taken
exclusively from monetary union itself.
The general commonality of trends is
impressive. The next step in this exercise
involves examining the role of our price stability
credibility variable in an otherwise fairly
standard demand for money function which, for
the purposes of the analysis and comparison
with the graphical analysis, is converted to a
velocity function.
5. Econometric Evidence
As noted already, despite almost full financial
market integration in the euro area, banking
assets and liabilities still remain stubbornly
national — one of the strong stylised facts to
emerge from the ECB’s Financial Integration in
Europe April 2010 report. This means that the
money stock reported for any particular country
of the union is used almost exclusively by
residents of that country. Although the money
stock in any one country of the union is
perfectly fungible with that of any other country,
it is nevertheless possible to explain the
developments in any country’s money stock by
conditioning variables relating just to that
country. So, despite a single currency and full
fungibility of euro-denominated money across
the whole of the euro area, it still makes sense
to talk of member states’ national demand for
euro-denominated money.
Since the anti-inflation credibility effects vary
across the member states of the monetary
union, there are important country-specific
influences on money demand in the EMU. A
disaggregated approach to money demand
that takes account of these should, when
aggregated, provide a better account of money
stock behaviour at the aggregate monetary
union level than a money demand function
estimated for the whole of the monetary union
area. Therefore, we propose modelling money
velocity as,
where Y is nominal income, M3 is the
contribution of the representative euro area
member state M3 money stock, CRED is the
inverse of the price stability credibility measure
described in Section 2, r
L–r
S is the net
opportunity cost variable capturing the slope of
the yield curve and INF is the expected one
period ahead inflation rate.
This model of money velocity dynamics is
estimated in a panel cointegration framework.
Non-stationarity is tested using Levin & Lin
(1992) methodology finding unit roots in money
velocity and in the credibility term but not in the
interest-rate differentials or expected inflation
terms. It is notable, therefore, that the long-term
downward trend in velocity as shown in Chart 1
for individual member states is determined
exclusively by the trend improvement in ECB
credibility.
It follows, therefore, that interest rates and
inflation expectations only explain the
adjustment towards this long-run equilibrium
and not the long-run equilibrium itself. The
resulting semi-log linear equations to be
estimated are accordingly:Central Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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(1)
(2)
where Yi is the log of nominal GDP in country i,
M3i is the contribution of county i to euro area
aggregate M3. CREDi is the credibility of the
ECB’s monetary policy based on country i’s
HICP as outlined in Section 2 above. INTi is the
difference between country i’s 5-year
government bond yield and the 3-month
EURIBOR rate. INFi is the expected inflation in
the next period as proxied by the one-period-
ahead HICP in county i. All data are quarterly
observations over the period 1999Q1 to
2009Q4.
A panel cointegration test approach is used to
detect the cointegration properties of the
variables. Allowing for a constant, there is
strong evidence for exactly one cointegrating
vector in the (Y/M3, CRED) system, consistent
with a long-run relationship between these
variables
3.
In terms of estimating the long-run relationship
between the variables, we follow the Pedroni
(2000) approach, adopting a fully modified OLS
(FM-OLS) framework where the coefficient on
credibility is estimated for each individual
country to provide the group estimate
presented in Table 1
4. Consistent with
graphical evidence above, an increase in
credibility increases the velocity of money. To
be more precise, a reduction in the CRED
variable (which is an increase in credibility)
leads to an increase in the demand for money,
3 The Kao (1999) & Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegrating tests
using the underlying Engle-Granger methodology are conducted
and a relationship of rank 1 is found at the 95 per cent confidence
level. A comprehensive outline of results is available upon
request.
4 Only group estimates are reported for brevity, with individual
coutry estimates available upon request.
Contact: Robert.Kelly@centralbank.ie
an increase in M3 as supply responds, and a
reduction in income velocity (Y/M3). Credibility
has a fairly sizable effect on income velocity
with a 1 per cent increase in credibility leading
to a decrease in money velocity by 0.51 per
cent. The cost of holding money is reduced
leading to a situation in which the pace of
money growth exceeds that of income.
In terms of short-run dynamics, the long-run
relationship is set equal to 0.51 for all countries
based on the FM-OLS group estimate. The
model is estimated allowing for fixed effects,
with all of the intercepts showing a significant
negative value. However, Burggeman (2000)
concludes that no direct implication can be
taken as it captures both the long- and short-
run constant term. However, one could interpret
the negative sign as an increase in the
unconditional growth of money velocity during
the sample period.
The two short-run explanatory variables (INT,
INF) are both significantly positive. This is
consistent with the traditional theory of money
demand. Higher long-run interest rates relative
to short rates increase the opportunity cost of
holding money now which impacts positively on
velocity. Inflation is also a cost on holding
money. In both cases, holding of money
relative to output will fall, resulting in an
increase in money velocity.
Estimates show a negative coefficient on the
error correction term, ς, which is consistent with
error correction theory. Any deviations from the
long-run equilibrium are corrected by ς in each
time period through the short-term dynamics
discussed above. Although negative, ς is small
indicating a slow speed of adjustment towards
the long-run equilibrium. One reason often
given for slow adjustment is the small cost of
being out of equilibrium or the high cost of
adjusting the money holding to equilibrium.
Also, real side shocks such as oil-price hikes
are often said to be responsible for the long
term persistence of disequilibrium.
6. Accounting for the Exception:
Ireland
There is only one outlier from the sample of the
ten member states included in the study. This
is Ireland. For Ireland, there was almost no
change in the credibility measure since theCentral Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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Notes: The constant in the ECM is the grouped estimate from the fixed affects and the appropriate number of lags (in this case 4) is
selected according to AIC. * and ** denotes different from zero at 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively.
start of EMU and only a very slight
improvement since 2003Q1. It started out at a
value of 0.3 and ended up at virtually the same
value, having increased slightly during the
10-year period before converging back to its
original value at the start monetary union.
The factors contributing to regional inflation
differentials in monetary union (such as the
Balassa-Samuelson effect, price-level and
standard-of-living forces of convergence as
well as differences in cyclical positions) seem
to have been especially potent in the Irish
case. Very rapid capital and money-market
convergence following financial market
liberalisation and the advent of monetary union
along with the much more sluggish, but none
the less ineluctable, convergence of income
and price levels threw up a very powerful
dynamic and helped sustain a boom especially
in the non-traded sector of the economy.
The example of Ireland in the 1990s and into
the new millennium suggests that in such an
environment, the real cost of debt capital may
fail to respond to domestic economic
fundamentals. This would have the effect of
suppressing a natural self-correcting market
mechanism. This was at least partly
responsible for the boom in the non-traded
sector of the economy, especially in the real
estate and construction industries. This
resulted in the price level in Ireland converging
on and then overshooting that in the core
countries of the monetary union.
Honohan and Lane (2003) have also brought
attention to this effect. In flagging the negative
correlation between pre- and post-EMU real
short-term interest rates, they note that the fall
in real interest rates in those EMU countries
with higher-than-average inflation is a
potentially destabilising factor, since it has the
effect of placing even further upward pressure
on inflation in those EMU countries with already
high inflation, thereby militating against inflation
convergence.
The failure of the credibility variable to perform
similarly to that in the other member states is
therefore, somewhat ironically, partly
attributable to monetary union itself which had
the effect of hampering the self-correcting
market mechanism which would otherwise have
been present. This released a dynamic that
drove the Irish price level above that of the
core countries and by a substantial margin.
This is the reason why we think that the price
stability credibility variable does not seem to
work in the Irish case. Other member states in
our sample did not have their price stability
credibility variable distorted by powerful short-
run dynamics in the same way or to the same
extent.
7. Concluding Remarks
The model and results presented here suggest
that the ECB should, in formulating the second
pillar of its monetary policy strategy, factor in
its own price stability credibility. More rapidCentral Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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money growth than would be forecast on the
basis of a conventional demand for money
function should not necessarily feed into a
more restrictive monetary policy stance if
attributable to a gain in its own inflation fighting
credibility. This additional money growth would
not be inflationary but rather the result of the
ECB reinforcing its reputation as an inflation
fighter. The corollary is also valid. Slower
money growth than would be predicted by
standard money demand models should not
serve as an input into a more relaxed monetary
policy stance if this slower money growth can
be ascribed to a loss of price stability
credibility. Our graphical and econometric
evidence suggest this credibility/reputational
effect is fairly substantial. This would suggest,
in turn, that if it is not taken into account in the
formulation of monetary policy, then there is a
significant potential for mistakes to be made in
the stance of monetary policy.
The ECB would have to be aware that its own
growing price stability credibility would have
this systematic effect on money demand and
velocity and that it should allow for this effect in
the second pillar of its monetary policy strategy
in formulating its monetary policy stance.
According to our model, a gain in price stability
reputation is self-reinforcing. It increases the
asset demand for money and, for a given
supply, reduces inflationary pressures and,
other things being equal, actual inflation. This
disinflation further enhances a central bank’s
credibility. Unfortunately, the corollary is also
true. Our model and results point to the danger
that any short-run loss of credibility by a central
bank with respect to its main statutory objective
of price stability can be self-reinforcing. An
upward shift in the price level relative to what
had been expected drives up our credibility
indicator and points to a loss of some
reputation by the ECB as an inflation fighter.
The higher tax on nominal money balances
reduces the demand for money and, relative to
a given supply, places upward pressure on
inflation which is ultimately realised in actual
inflation.
It should be noted that this reduction in the
demand for money does not, per se, lead to a
reduction in the stock of nominal money
balances outstanding, unless in the case where
the counterparty is a non-resident of the euro
area. However, the collective attempt of money
holders to offload money balances, on account
of the impending implicit tax, puts upward
pressure on expenditures and, depending on
the cyclical position of the economy, on
inflation. Previous money hoarding becomes
dishoarding with a wall of money spilling over
into household and corporate expenditures and
putting upward pressure on inflation. The
attendant loss of credibility tends to prompt
more dishoarding and cause even greater
inflation and loss of credibility.
This could therefore be a potential source of
instability emanating from the second pillar.
However, in invoking the second pillar in the
formulation of monetary policy, allowance
would have to be made for this.
For most of the sample period since the
commencement of monetary union in 1999, this
mechanism worked benignly. The ECB’s
success in maintaining price stability, relative to
the poor inflation record in the legacy regimes
of many of the member states, has resulted in
a trend fall in money velocity of circulation in
the euro area, as our theory suggests. By
corollary, the loss of credibility should drive the
income velocity of circulation higher. There is
also some supporting evidence for this in our
very limited sample afforded by the history of
monetary union to date.
From a policy perspective, there is indeed an
additional reason why our theory and results
would seem to place a lot of weight on the
importance of a central bank not losing
credibility in the first place. It is because, in the
context of the multi-country setting of our
model, monetary union makes it more difficult
to regain credibility once lost. The problem is
that credibility is lost or gained at a national
level. What is important for the ECB’s reputation
is national inflation rates relative to the same
national inflation rates in the past even, as our
theory and results suggest, this is the fairly
distant past. Member countries with inflation
above the ECB’s target may not be
compensated by countries with inflation belowCentral Bank Credibility and Income Velocity
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the target if this inflation is negative, which is
not consistent with price stability. So, the ECB
may lose credibility even if area-wide inflation
for the euro area is consistent with price
stability.
In other words, the ECB’s credibility may be
affected adversely by relative price movements
across member countries of the euro area. This
poses a potentially substantial problem for the
ECB. Part of this stems from the fact that it
might be placed in a position in which it loses
price stability credibility due to factors which
are outside of its control.
This stems from the past chequered record in
relation to inflation in many of the member
states of the Eurosystem. Any reminder of the
abuses of the old national high inflation
regimes results in a reduction in the demand
for money and inflationary pressures. So, even
for an unchanged stance of monetary policy, a
loss of inflation fighting credibility at the
national level can, by itself, generate an
acceleration of inflation. It also implies that, if
credibility is lost temporarily (because of say a
blip in the price level due to a random shock),
it is hugely important to re-establish it as soon
as possible.
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